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DETERMINANTS OF AGRICULTURAL LAND RENTAL MARKET TRANSACTIONS IN 
BANGLADESH 
SANZIDUR RAHMAN 
Abstract 
 Land rental market transactions have been the norm in land scarce rural Bangladesh mainly 
due to the inadequacies of the governmental land distribution system to meet the growing 
demand for land and to correct imbalances in factor proportions at the farm level. The 
present study jointly determines the socio-economic factors underlying decision to rent-in 
land and/or rent-out land by the Bangladeshi farmers in the land rental market using a 
bivariate Tobit model. The model diagnostic reveals that the decisions to rent-in and/or rent-
out land is significantly correlated, implying that univariate analysis of such decisions are 
biased, thereby, justifying the use of a bivariate approach. Results reveal that a number of 
socio-economic factors affect farmers’ participation in the land rental market and work in 
opposite directions regarding the decision to rent-in or rent-out  land. The likelihood of renting-
in land is higher for farmers with inadequate cultivable land but with higher levels of livestock 
and other farm capital asset ownership, and also for those located in areas with developed 
infrastructure and fertile soils. On the other hand, the likelihood of renting-out land is higher 
among farmers with higher levels of cultivable land but inadequate farm capital and livestock 
resources, higher levels of education, less subsistence pressure, and poor extension contact. 
Geography does matter, as the likelihood of land transactions is higher in agriculturally 
intensive and/or developed regions. Government policy has an important role to play to 
improve the factor equalisation role of these land rental markets through, for example, 
investment in education, agricultural extension, rural infrastructure and the livestock sector.  
JEL Classification: Q15. 
Keywords:  Land market transactions, bivariate Tobit model, Bangladesh 
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1. Introduction 
Land is the major source of wealth and livelihood in rural Bangladesh, as in other South Asian 
countries, although the land/person ratio is one of the lowest in the world, estimated at 0.12 ha 
(FAO, 2001). Bangladesh is also one of the most densely populated nations of the world, with 
small farms and high levels of land fragmentation. This is further complicated by shrinking 
availability of land per farm holding due to rising population pressure and closure of the land 
frontier. Table 1 presents farm dynamics in Bangladesh based on three censuses of agriculture 
and livestock over the past three decades. The number of farm holdings initially increased 
rapidly, but then slowed down and there has been a major shift in the composition of farm size 
groups. Unlike the experience in East Asian countries, such as, Japan and Korea, where farm 
sizes are getting larger as the number of operational holdings are going down (Niroula and 
Thapa, 2005), Bangladesh is experiencing rapid decline in farm sizes, coupled with an increase 
in the number of operational holdings. The average farm size shrank to a level (0.68 ha) at 
which it is unlikely to sustain livelihoods1. The number of small farms increased dramatically at 
the expense of a reduction in the number of large and medium sized farms. The situation 
deteriorates further when one considers fragmentation of total land holdings into parcels. 
Overall, although the number of fragments per holding declined, the average size of fragments 
has declined in Bangladesh. Nevertheless, the average size of fragments has increased for the 
large farm size categories, implying that some consolidation is taking place for this size group, 
perhaps through purchase or simple appropriation from marginal or landless farmers through an 
exploitative tenurial system.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
                     
1
 “Small farmers with less than 1 ha of landholdings cannot fulfil their subsistence requirements through 
agriculture … ” (Niroula and Thapa, 2005). 
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 Since land is in short supply in this densely populated agrarian economy, access to land 
through rental markets has been an important source to increase the operational farm size to an 
optimal level. Although, the total number of tenants has increased by 22% from 3.7 million in 
1983/84 to 4.6 million in 1996, the area available for tenancy remained stagnant at 1.9 million 
ha, implying increased competition in later years (BBS, 1999). Also, 33.8% of total farmers 
operated as tenants in 1996 of which, 10.2% were pure tenants (BBS, 1999). The two common 
land rental categories in Bangladesh are: (i) share-cropping arrangements, and (ii) cash renting 
at a fixed predetermined rate. The Land Reform Act of 1984 fixed rents for share-cropping 
tenants at 33% of the harvest for the landlords (without input sharing) or 50% if inputs are 
shared at a 50% rate (Akanda et al., 2008).   
 Although existence of land rental markets has been dominant in Bangladesh, little is 
known about the key factors that influence the decision to rent-in or rent-out land and the 
intensity of transactions. In an environment in which factor markets are incomplete, a farm 
household’s initial factor endowments, such as owned land, livestock, family labour, and other 
socio-economic characteristics are likely to influence its position in the land rental market. This 
is because, transactions on the land rental markets have a tendency to contribute towards 
equalizing the size distribution of the farm by: (a) allowing access to land through renting-in by 
the marginal/landless farmers, and/or (b) promoting a type of equalisation process as large 
farmers rent-out land and thus transfer land to smaller holdings (Teklu and Lemi, 2004).  
 Given this backdrop, the aim of this paper is to analyse these land rental markets in 
Bangladesh by explicitly examining the factors that influence the demand side and/or the supply 
side of the market using a bivariate Tobit model. The advantage of this bivariate approach, as 
opposed to the univariate approach commonly seen in the literature (i.e., single equation tobit 
models of either renting-in land or renting-out land estimated independently), is that it enables 
us to examine the decision making process of a single farmer who engages with the land rental 
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market both as a tenant and as a landlord at the same time. Also, the estimation of a bivariate 
model is more efficient because it not only nests individual univariate models but also enables 
us to determine jointness of the decision making process by providing an estimate of the 
correlation between the error terms of the two univariate models. The paper proceeds as 
follows: section 2 describes the analytical framework, the study area and the data; section 3 
presents the results; and section 4 draws some conclusions and policy implications. 
2. Research Methodology 
2.1 Analytical framework 
 Following Teklu and Lemi (2004), we also postulate that farmers follow sequential 
decisions; firstly ‘whether to participate in the land rental market or not’; and then second, if 
participating, ‘then how much to transact’. In such a case, a censored regression model (i.e., 
tobit model) is most suitable because it uses all observations, both those which are at the 
limit, usually zero (e.g., non-participants), and those above the limit (e.g., participants), to 
estimate a regression line as opposed to other techniques that use observations which are only 
above the limit value (McDonald and Moffit, 1980). The procedure also captures the latent 
level of intensity of potential farmers who decide not to participate in the land rental market 
(Teklu and Lemi, 2004). Let the land transaction function be given by: 
)1('* iii XL µβ +=  
where Xi is the vector of regression, β is the vector of parameters to be estimated, and µi is the 
error term. For farmers participating in the land rental market, *iL  equals the actual level of 
transaction (Li). For those who are not participating in the market, 
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The advantage of the tobit model as in Eq(2) is that it captures the decision to participate as 
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well as the intensity of transaction in the land rental market, whereas a probit model will 
provide only information on the decision to participate.  
In general, we designate those who rent-out land as the landlords and those who rent-
in land as the tenants, and therefore, presume that these two groups of farmers are distinctly 
different with respect to their socio-economic circumstances. As a consequence, most of the 
literature examining the determinants of land market transactions (e.g., Kung, 2002; 
Deininger et al., 2003; Teklu and Lemi, 2004; Deininger and Jin, 2005; Swinnen et al., 2006; 
Vranken and Swinnen, 2006; Masterson, 2007; and Holden et al., 2007) implicitly assumed 
that the decision to rent-in land and rent-out land are independent of each other, and therefore, 
estimated separately. However, in this study, we propose that the same farmer can participate 
in the land rental market, both as a tenant to rent-in land as well as a landlord to rent-out land. 
This is a plausible assumption, particularly in the case of Bangladesh, where farmers’ total 
holdings are usually composed of several parcels of land scattered over a wide area 
characterised with varying size, quality and other factors2. Therefore, the same farmer can 
choose to rent-out some of his/her land which is perhaps located far-off from his/her 
homestead and/or is of poorer quality, and at the same time rent-in land which is perhaps 
nearer to his/her homestead or other plots. Such an action will allow the farmer to maintain an 
optimal size of cultivable land although this may now be composed of a combination of 
rented-in and owned land. In fact, evidence from our sample data suggests that some farmers 
did rent-in land as well as rent-out land (Table 2). Therefore, in order to incorporate such 
dynamics in the decision to participate in the land rental market, we postulate a bivariate tobit 
                     
2
 For example, a survey of rice farmers in Southern region of Bangladesh showed that although the average farm 
size is small (0.78 ha), the average level of land fragmentation is 4.4 with a range from a single plot farm to a 
maximum of a 21 plot farm (Rahman and Rahman, 2009). The Agricultural Census of 1996 also reveals that the 
average number of fragments per farm is 6 (BBS, 1999).  
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where *1iL  denotes farmers who participate in the land market to rent-in land; 
*
2iL  denotes 
farmers who participate in the land market to rent-out land; ρ is the correlation between the 
error terms µ1i and µ2i. The distributions are independent if and only if ρ=0. The full 
maximum likelihood estimation procedure is utilized using STATA-10 (STATA Corp., 2007) 
software program.  
2.2 The study area and sample of farmers 
The study is based on farm-level cross section data for the crop year 1996 collected 
from three agro-ecological regions of Bangladesh. The survey was conducted from February 
to April 1997. Samples were collected from eight villages of the Jamalpur Sadar sub-district 
of Jamalpur (representing wet agro-ecology), six villages of the Manirampur sub-district of 
Jessore (representing dry agro-ecology), and seven villages of the Matlab sub-district of 
Chandpur (representing wet agro-ecology in an agriculturally advanced area). A multistage 
random sampling technique was employed to locate the districts, then the Thana (sub-
districts), then the villages in each of the three sub-districts, and finally the sample 
households. A total of 406 households
3
 from these 21 villages were selected. Detailed 
                     
3
 The sample households were selected based on the information on the total number of households including 
their land ownership categories, which were obtained from BRAC (a national non-governmental organization). 
Then a stratified random sampling procedure was applied using a formula from Arkin and Colton (1963) that 
maximizes the sample size with a 5% error limit. Farm size categories (large, medium, and small farmers) were 
used as the strata (for details, see Rahman, 1998).  
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information on land ownership patterns, crop input-output data and selected socio-economic 
indicators for individual farm households were collected. The dataset also includes information 
on the level of infrastructural development and soil fertility, determined from soil samples 
collected from representative locations in the study villages. 
2.3 The empirical model 
A bivariate tobit model is developed to empirically investigate the socio-economic factors 
underlying the decision to participate in the land rental market as tenants compared with the 
decision to participate as landlords in Bangladesh. The choice of variables representing socio-
economic circumstances of the farmer is based on the existing literature dealing with land 
market transactions, with similar justification therein (e.g., Kung, 2002; Deininger, et al., 
2003; Teklu and Lemi, 2004; Tikabo and Holden, 2004; Deininger and Jin, 2005; Swinnen et 
al., 2006; Vranken and Swinnen, 2006; Holden et al., 2007; and Masterson, 2007). The most 
common variables used in these studies were: age of the farmer, education, land and non-land 
resource endowments, irrigation access, and off-farm employment. However, we have also 
added additional household level and regional level variables that we hypothesise as having 
an influence on the land market participation decision although not commonly seen in the 
literature, e.g., access to extension services, level of crop diversification, levels of 
infrastructural development, soil fertility and income inequality in the study villages.  
The dependent variables are the actual amount of land rented-in per capita and actual 
amount of land rented-out per capita. The socio-economic variables explaining decisions to 
participate in the land rental markets are: amount of total cultivated land owned, value of 
farm capital assets, value of livestock asset, highest level of education in the household, 
farming experience, subsistence pressure, extension contact in the past year, share of non-
agricultural income in total income, level of crop diversification4, and access to irrigation. 
                     
4
 A Herfindahl index is used to represent the specialization/diversification variable. Although, this index is 
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The three village level variables include an index of underdevelopment of infrastructure5, a 
soil fertility index
6
, and a Gini-coefficient of income inequality, along with  two dummy 
variables to account for regional variations (i.e., Comilla and Jamalpur, whereas the effect of 
Jessore is subsumed in the intercept term). The definition, measure and summary statistics of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
mainly used in the marketing industry to analyze market concentration, it has also been used to represent crop 
diversification and/or concentration (e.g., Llewelyn and Williams, 1996; Bradshaw, 2004; Rahman 2009). The 
Herfindahl index is represented as: ∑
=
=
n
i
iPDV
1
2
, where Pi is the proportion of farm area involved in a 
particular enterprise. The value of Herfindahl index ranges between 0 and 1 with 0 denoting perfect 
diversification and 1 denoting perfect specialization. 
5 A composite ‘index of underdevelopment of infrastructure’ was constructed using the cost of access approach.  
A total of 13 elements are considered for its construction. These are primary market, secondary market, storage 
facility, rice mill, paved road, bus stop, bank, union office, agricultural extension office, high school, college, 
thana (sub-district) headquarters, and post office.  A total cost (TC) of access was computed by summing up 
individual costs (ICi) of access (i.e., distance x cost per km). Then, TC was correlated with costs for each element 
(ICi) which provided individual correlation coefficients (Wi). The final index (INF) was then calculated by 
summing up all the ICs (each weighted by its correlation coefficient) and divided by sum of all correlation 
coefficients (see Ahmed and Hossain, 1990 for further details). 
6
 The ‘soil fertility index’ was constructed from the test results of soil samples collected from the study villages. 
Ten soil fertility parameters were tested; these are soil pH, available nitrogen, available potassium, available 
phosphorus, available sulphur, available zinc, soil texture, soil organic matter content, cation exchange capacity 
of soil, and electrical conductivity of soil (for details of sampling and tests, see Rahman and Parkinson, 2007 and 
Rahman, 1998). A composite weighted index of soil fertility was constructed using a Likert type scale. First, 
each of the soil parameters were categorized into ‘high’, ‘medium’ or ‘low’ level following the guideline 
provided by the Soil Resources Development Institute (SRDI) of Bangladesh, which assigns these categories 
based on a range of values of each soil parameter required for crop growth (SRDI, 1991).  Then, the soil fertility 
index was constructed by summing up the index of each soil parameter, divided by the total number of 
parameters used in the computation.  
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these variables are provided in Table 3. 
 Since a priori information is not available on which variables affect the decision to 
rent-in land and/or rent-out land, we have incorporated the same set of variables in both 
models, but expect to see differential influences of these socio-economic factors on the 
decision to participate as tenants and/or landlords in the land rental market. For example, the 
influence of other non-land assets may affect the decision to rent-in and rent-out differently. 
While land poor farmers may opt to rent-in land, to arrive at an optimum farm size, large 
landowners may opt to rent-out surplus land to raise income. The other variables that we 
expect to have differential influences are: farm capital assets, livestock (a key resource in 
farming which is largely used as draft power in Bangladesh), level of education in the 
household, subsistence pressure, and the three village level variables.     
3. Results and discussions 
3.1 Extent of participation in the land rental market 
Table 2 presents the extent of participation of sampled farmers in the land rental 
market. A total of four possibilities were considered: (a) non-participants, i.e., farmers who 
neither rent-in nor rent-out land, (b) tenants or part-tenants, i.e., farmers who rent-in land 
only, (c) landlords, i.e., farmers who rent-out land only, and (d) mixed role, i.e., farmers who 
rent-in and rent-out land. Overall, 37% of the sampled farmers did not participate in the land 
market (highest 42% in Jessore), thereby justifying the use of a truncated regression (tobit) 
model. Also, 38% of the farmers participated in the land market to rent-in land only (highest 
42% in Comilla characterized by lowest per capital land ownership). The proportion of 
farmers participating in the land rental market as landlords (i.e., renting-out land only) is 
almost the same in every region, standing at 21%. Also, 6.3% of farmers (the overall figure is 
4%) participated in the land-rental market both as landlords as well as tenants in Jamalpur, an 
intensive agricultural region, thereby, justifying the use of the bivariate approach.  
 10 
 
 
One of the explanations of non-participation in the land rental market is the 
transaction cost (Teklu and Lemi, 2004; Tikabo and Holden, 2004) and that transaction cost 
would drive a wedge between the costs and benefits of tenancy as a landlord and/or as a 
tenant (Bell and Sussangkarn, 1988). The degree of non-participation in the land rental 
market is an indication of the fixed transaction costs in the market, since it is highly unlikely 
that all these non-participating households have optimal levels of all factors (both land and 
non-land factors). The overall rate of non-participation of our sample farmers in the land 
rental market is considerably lower than those reported by Tikabo and Holden (2004) for 
Eritrea, estimated at 46%. This is consistent with expectations, since land scarcity in 
Bangladesh is far higher than in Eritrea. Also, it may be probable that the implied transaction 
cost of participating in the land rental market is higher in Eritrea than in Bangladesh. 
Although the amount of land rented-in per farm is substantially higher (0.13 ha per 
farm), the amount of land rented-in and rented-out per capita is exactly the same at 0.02 ha 
with little inter-regional variations. The implication is that the surface rented-out and surface 
rented-in are almost equal in each region and that the land rental markets serve well in 
correcting factor proportions at the farm-level. Almost a third of the operational farm size is 
composed of renting-in land, with little variation across regions, implying that farmers 
located in different areas face the same constraint of land scarcity. On the other hand, 23% of 
cultivated land that is owned is rented-out by farmers.   
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
3.2 Determinants of participation in the land rental market 
Summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 3. The 
average amount of cultivated land owned is 0.54 ha; the average highest level of education in 
the household is 6.9 years; experience in farming is 25.5 years; average family size is six 
persons; 22% of income is derived off-farm; and only 13% of farmers have had contact with 
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extension services during the past year. The computed Herfindahl index of crop 
diversification ranges from 0.18 to 1.00, with a mean score of 0.60, indicating strong presence 
of diversification among enterprises; and 62% of the farm area is irrigated. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
The result of the full information maximum likelihood estimation of the bivariate 
Tobit model is presented in Table 4. Prior to discussion of the findings we present the results 
of various model diagnostic tests reported in the lower panel of Table 4. Globally, 50% of the 
estimated coefficients were significantly different from zero, at 10% level at least indicating 
that inclusion of these variables were correctly justified in explaining the determinants of land 
transactions. The Wald χ
2
 test results further indicates statistically that these variables 
contribute significantly as a group to the explanation of the joint determinants of renting-in 
and renting-out land by the farmers. The key hypothesis of “correlation of the disturbance 
term between the two equations “per capita land rented-in” and “per capita land rented-
out” is zero {i.e., ρ(rented-in, rented-out) = 0}” is strongly rejected at the 1% level of 
significance, implying that the use of a bivariate tobit model to determine farmers’ decisions 
to participate in the land rental market is justified. This result also confirms that univariate 
analysis of such a decision making process will lead to biased results, which is a common 
practice in the literature. Also, both sigma values were significantly different from zero at the 
1% level. 
Apart from reporting model diagnostic results from the bivariate tobit model, we 
present some additional fit measures of the model based on univariate tobit models of renting-
in land and renting-out land7. We report two fit measures, namely, the McFadden’s R
2
 and 
                     
7 This is because the available softwares which allow bivariate tobit model to be estimated (i.e., LIMDEP 9 
and/or STATA 10) do not provide any additional model diagnostic tests. However, STATA 10 reports a detailed 
set of model fit results for univariate tobit models. Our assumption in reporting these results is that if the tests 
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McKelvey and Zavoina’s R
2
. Overall, the fit seems to be relatively better for the rented-in 
land model compared with the rented-out land model. The typical value of McFadden’s R
2 
lies between 0.20 – 0.40 (Sonka et al., 1989) which is also seen in our results. The 
implication is that our full models are better than the intercept only models. Similarly, the 
square root of the McKelvey and Zavoina’s R
2 
provides a measure of the correlation between 
the latent continuous variable and the predicted probabilities. Our results show that the 
strength of such correlation is 0.871 for the rented-in land model and 0.508 for the rented-out 
model, indicating strong predictability. Finally, we test for the key assumption of the 
normality of the residuals of a tobit model using the Conditional Moments Test (H0: Tobit 
residuals are normally distributed). We apply the method proposed by Drukker (2002) who 
recommended that the critical values for the test should be obtained via a parametric 
bootstrapping method after Tobit estimation (for details of testing procedure, see Drukker, 
2002). We applied 1000 replications to obtain our critical values in order to essentially 
remove the classic criticism of size distortions arising from the standard conditional moments 
test after Tobit estimation. The test results confirm that the null hypothesis of the normality of 
Tobit residuals cannot be rejected, at the 1% level, for any of the models.    
[Insert Table 4 here]  
It is clear from Table 4 that a number of socio-economic factors (both land and non-land 
factors) affect farmers’ participation in the land rental market but thse work in opposite 
directions regarding decision to rent-in or rent-out land, as anticipated. A total of eight variables 
have a significant relationship with the decision to rent-in land and another eight variables 
have a significant relationship with the decision to rent-out land. The likelihood of renting-in 
land is higher for farmers with inadequate owned cultivated land, as expected. Also, the 
likelihood of renting-in land is higher for farmers with higher levels of livestock and other farm 
                                                                                                                                                                     
hold for each of the univariate models, it is highly likely that they will also hold for the bivariate model. 
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capital assets. The implication is that those who are rich in non-land factors (e.g., livestock or 
farm capital assets) rent-in land, to optimise their farm sizes, in order to utilize their surplus 
resources, which corresponds with the findings of Kung (2002), Tikabo and Holden (2004), 
Holden et al., (2007), and Masterson, (2007) for farmers in China, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and 
Paraguay, respectively. Deininger and Jin (2005) also noted that, contrary to concerns that 
land rental markets may leave out the poor, market transactions did transfer land to those with 
lower initial endowments in China.  
The exact opposite is true for farmers who rent-out land. We see that the endowment of 
cultivable land significantly influences the decision to rent-out land which also corresponds 
with the findings of Teklu and Lemi (2004). Also, farmers endowed with inadequate non-land 
factors (e.g., farm capital and livestock resources) are more likely to rent-out land, which 
corresponds with the findings of Tikabo and Holden (2004) and Holden et al., (2007).  
The impact of education on the decision to rent-out and/or rent-in land is quite mixed 
in the literature. We see that the households with high levels of educated members (not 
necessarily the household head) are more likely to rent-out land, whilst the opposite is true for 
the households who rent-in land. The implication is that the opportunity to engage in non-
farm activities increases with education and, therefore, households rent-out land in order to 
substitute their time input away from agricultural production. This finding corresponds with 
Deininger et al., (2003), Teklu and Lemi (2004), and Swinnen et al., (2006) but is in contract 
with Tikabo and Holden (2004), Holden et al., (2007) and Masterson (2007). They noted that 
farmers’ education either has a negative impact on land rented-out or a positive impact on 
land rented-in, implying imperfection in the market for human capital. On the other hand, 
Kung (2002) and Vranken and Swinnen (2006) noted that education significantly reduces the 
demand for rented-in land in China and Hungary, which is also observed in our study. Teklu 
and Lemi (2004) noted that an increase in the level of education tends to increase the 
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opportunity cost of participating in farming, which we think is true for Bangladesh as well.    
Farming experience, which is arguably a more direct measure of experience than age, 
but used by very few in the literature (e.g., Tikabo and Holden, 2004), seems to have no 
influence on the decision to rent-in or rent-out land, which is quite contrary to some of the 
findings in the literature which are, in turn, very mixed in their conclusions. For example, Kung 
(2002) and Vranken and Swinnen (2006) reported positive influence of age on renting-in land, 
while Deininger et al., (2003), Tikabo and Holden (2004), and Masterson (2007) reported a 
negative influence. On the other hand, Teklu and Lemi (2004), Swinnen et al., (2006) and 
Masterson (2007) reported a positive influence of age on renting-out land, while Deininger and 
Jin (2005) reported a negative influence.     
The likelihood of renting-out land is higher among households with relatively less 
subsistence pressure (i.e., lower family size), which corresponds with the findings of Teklu and 
Lemi (2004). Kung (2002) reported that dependency ratio positively influence decision to rent-
in land.   
Farmers with poor extension contacts are also more likely to rent-out land. This may be 
because farmers with lack of access to technological information and knowhow find it better to 
rent-out land and earn a fixed predetermined income rather than going through the uncertain 
production process.  
The effect of non-agricultural income share is uni-directionally negative but is 
significant in the rented-out model, implying that farmers with a lower share of non-agricultural 
income tend to rent-out land to raise total household income. Kung (2002), however, noted that 
households with active participation in the off-farm labour market rent-in less land in China.  
The effect of crop diversification and access to irrigation seem to have no influence on 
the likelihood to participate in the land market, whereas Tikabo and Holden (2004) found a 
positive influence of size of area irrigated on the decision to rent-in land and a negative 
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influence on the decision to rent-out land in Eritrea. 
Among the village level variables, the likelihood of renting-in land is higher in areas 
with developed infrastructure as well as fertile soils. This is because developed infrastructure 
eases the constraints on marketing of outputs, purchase of inputs, access to information and so 
forth. Therefore, farmers with initial lower land endowment are likely to rent-in land to optimise 
their farm size and reap the benefit of developed infrastructure. Ahmed and Hossain (1990) 
concluded that infrastructure has profound impacts on the income of the poor in Bangladesh, 
raising their income by 33%, which is partially the result of a higher level of modern rice 
technology adoption that in turn increases the demand for cultivable land.  
Our results show that farmers tend to rent-in land in fertile areas in order to reap the 
benefit of higher productivity of crops from soils of relatively high fertility status of the soils. 
Vranken and Swinnen (2006) used an indicator variable for land quality at county level 
measured in terms of monetary value, but found no influence of this variable on the decision to 
rent-in or rent-out land in Hungary. 
Village level inequality seems to have no effect on the decision to participate in the 
land market, in contrast to Teklu and Lemi (2004) who observed that farmers in villages with 
initial high degrees of inequality transact more land through land rental markets in Ethiopia.  
 Geography does matter. The incidence of transacting land is significantly higher in the 
Comilla and Jamalpur regions, which is also reflected in Table 2. Both the Comilla and 
Jamalpur regions are relatively densely populated areas, with very low land ownership per 
capita as compared with Jessore. In fact, Jamalpur is the official agricultural production region 
of the country, while Comilla is conventionally an agriculturally developed region where most 
of the innovations were initiated, e.g. green revolution technology. 
4. Conclusions and policy implications 
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The study explores the socio-economic determinants of the decision to participate in the 
agricultural land rental markets in rural Bangladesh, using a bivariate Tobit model. The 
results are discussed explicitly in light of the existing literature, to compare and contrast our 
findings. In addition a cognisant of the fact that each country is unique in its setting and 
therefore, should be studied separately, we would expect to see a certain level of robustness 
of results across studies.  
Our approach also allows for greater flexibility as it enables us to examine both the 
demand side as well as the supply side factors of land market transactions jointly. The model 
diagnostics have confirmed jointness of the decision to rent-in and/or rent-out land, thereby, 
justifying our use of the bivariate approach. 
The results reveal that a number of socio-economic factors affect farmers’ participation 
in the land rental market but work in opposite directions regarding decisions to rent-in or rent-
out land. The hypothesis that resource rich but land poor farmers tend to rent-in land, while land 
rich but resource poor farmers tend to rent-out land has been validated in our study. The broader 
implication of this finding is that these land rental markets go a long way to equalising the 
unbalanced factor proportions of individual farmers, and are broadly in line with the findings of 
the existing literature. Apart from land and non-land productive resources, other socio-economic 
and regional level factors play an important role in farmers’ decisions to engage with the land 
rental markets. For example, education seemingly enables households to engage in non-farm 
activities and, therefore, educated households tend to rent-out land, while households with less 
education opt to rent-in land. In addition, poor extension contact, less subsistence pressure and 
lower shares of non-agricultural income induces households to rent-out land.  
Government policy has an important role to play to improve the factor equalisation role 
of these land rental markets because farming is still dominant as an important source of 
livelihood in Bangladesh. However, the conventional land reform measure to equalise land 
 17 
 
 
ownership amongst farmers, which is a common policy suggestion in land scarce economies, is 
not feasible in the case of Bangladesh because of the technical and economic limitations, as 
well as political economy, of its agrarian structure. For example, Rahman and Rahman (2009) 
noted that the compulsory redistribution of land from large farmers to marginal and landless 
farmers (probably impossible to implement) would leave each landless household with only 
0.21 ha of land, which is unviable as a livelihood resource. Furthermore, land is only one of 
the key essential factors required in order to sustain livelihoods from farming. Other key 
factors (e.g., livestock resources and farm capital assets) which are also unequally distributed 
among the farming population are essential in farming too. Therefore, the key policy thrust 
will be to facilitate operation of the land rental markets, as well as to improve ownership of 
the non-land resources that are also essential in farm operations. Our results clearly 
demonstrate that a sensible approach, therefore, would be to invest in education (targeted to 
farm households), agricultural extension services, rural infrastructures, as well as the 
livestock sector. All these investment areas also have a synergistic role in improving 
production efficiency of Bangladeshi farmers (Rahman and Rahman, 2009 and Rahman and 
Hasan, 2008) which, in turn, would improve the overall livelihoods of these farm households. 
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